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Summary
summary of Soviet industrial performance must start with a few words
on the difficulties of appraising it. The student of the Soviet economy takes
his data from the official Soviet press, and therein lie unusual troubles.
Some scholars may find it hard to believe that Soviet statistics are "really"
worse than others, because every specialist in no matter what field quickly
becomes convinced that no data could be as bad as those he is forced to
work with. Why call the kettle black when it is probably no grayer than
the pot?
Let us acknowledge at once that all statistics contain faults and errors.
Let us also acknowledge that no government or other agency resists the
temptation to stretch figures to its own account if it feels it can get away
with it.Representative government, competitive scholarship, and free
public discourse are the Western institutions that have counteracted error
and misrepresentation in statistics, imperfectly to be sure but at least to an
important degree.
The peculiar difficulties with Soviet statistics stem, in the first instance,
from the system of authoritarian, centralized planning—from what has
been called a "command economy." Published statistics come from only
one source: the state. There are no independent sources to restrain each
other or to be used as checks against each other, except to the extent that
related figures published by different state agencies might not be fully
coordinated before publication.Moreover, the suppliers of data to the
central authorities—the economic and administrative units—have a
stake in the figures they report, since their performance is judged on the
basis of them. The Soviet statistical authorities do not hide their concern
over the misreporting that results from this feature of the economic
system.
A second set of difficulties stems from the crusading nature of Soviet
communism. Statistics are grist for the propaganda mill. The drive to
proselyte prevents Soviet leaders from viewing and dispensing facts in a
passive and detached manner.
For both broad reasons, Soviet statistics are selective and of varying
reliability and ambiguity. The policy of selectivity has two rather opposing
results as far as statistics on physical output are concerned. On the one
hand, some areas of poor performance are shielded from view, being
underrepresented in published data. On the other hand, some of the
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more rapidly expanding economic activities associated with the military
sector are also not reported on.It is impossible to determine the net bias
of the sample of published data—whether there is, on this count, a net
over- or understatement of growth.'
A few broad generalizations can be made about the reliability of the
published statistics.In the first place, absolute output is probably over-
stated in the case of most industries, particularly for the years within the
Plan period, though the degree of overstatement cannot be determined.
In the second place, growth in output is also probably overstated relative
to a prerevolutionary or an early Soviet base, but not necessarily over
other parts of the Soviet period. Over some of the latter years growth may
be overstated, over others understated, and over still others more or less
accurately reported. This will vary from industry to industry and from
one situation to another.
Whatever the faults of data on output of individual industries, they are
more reliable than official aggregative measures, such as the official
Soviet index of industrial production. Although the details underlying
this index have not been made public, Western specialists are generally
agreed that, from what they know about the construction and behavior
of the index, it heavily exaggerates industrial growth, though apparently
decreasingly so in recent years.
There are other factors in addition to the defects in basic statistics that
make it difficult to construct meaningful measures of aggregate industrial
production.Soviet prices generally do not accurately reflect relative
costs of production; the industrial structure has shifted radically over
short periods of time and has increasingly favored sectors where growth
is most easily achieved; growth rates have differed widely from sector to
sector; growth has been interrupted at critical points by major distur-
bances;and so on.Finally, quantitative growth has not been ac-
companied by the general improvement in quality that has characterized
industrial development in most Western countries.
These considerations make it difficult to summarize Soviet industrial
performance in terms of mere numbers. But a summary is useful and
necessary, and it cannot be fully qualified at every point without turning
it into the voluminous report it is supposed to summarize. In what follows,
the necessary qualifications are intended to be implicit throughout, and
they should be kept in mind to dull the edge of deceptively sharp figures.
These brief comments apply to the condition of economic statistics since 1956.
Between 1938 and 1956, statistics on physical output of individual industries were not




Soviet industrial output multiplied more than six times over the period
1913—1955.Performance varied widely among sectors, with output
multiplying fifty-eight times in the case of machinery and equipment
(including military products), nine times in the case of intermediate
industrial products, but only three times in the case of consumer goods.
The average annual growth rate was 4.4 per cent for industry as a whole,
10.1 per cent for machinery and equipment, 5.5 per cent for intermediate
industrial products, and 2.6 per cent for consumer goods.
Some of this growth is attributable to the territorial expansion that took
place during and after World War II. We have estimated that the
acquired territories added about 11 per cent to industrial output, and,
if we suppose that this relation would also have held true in 1955, the
average annual growth rate for all industry over the Soviet period would
have to be reduced from 4.4 to 4.1 per cent to eliminate the gains from
territorial expansion. The assumptions underlying such an adjustment
are, of course, somewhat arbitrary.
The dispersal of growth trends (unadjusted for territorial expansion)
may be seen more clearly by examining a finer breakdown of industries.
For a sample of seventy industries, growth rates ranged from an average
annual decline of 0.9 per cent to an average annual increase of 16.8 per
cent; the middle half of these growth rates ranged between increases of
2.5 and 8.5 per cent. The median was 5.3 per cent, which is higher than
the weighted average of 4.4 per cent shown by the production index.
Industries producing consumer goods dominate a distinct, lower region of
growth and are essentially confined to it, while other industries are
concentrated about a higher region.
The over-all growth rate is lower for the Soviet period than for the last
forty-odd years of the Tsarist period, when the growth rate was 5.3 per
cent a year according to our index. Although the latter is based on a
weak foundation of data and might have come out differently if better
data had been available, one may allow for substantial relative over-
statement of Tsarist growth, presuming all the error in that direction,
and still conclude that it was faster than growth over the entire Soviet
period. As to individual industries, higher growth rates in the one period
are not systematically related with either higher or lower growth rates
in the other. Here again, the sample is small, covering only twenty-three
industries, and conclusions must therefore be tempered.
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There has been a rather striking inverse relation between the rapidity
of growth in an industry over the Soviet period and its "stage of develop-
ment" at the beginning of the period.For a sample of forty-eight
industries, those whose outputs were the smallest relative to the United
States in 1913 have shown a strong tendency to grow the fastest. The
tendency is even more pronounced when the Plan period is considered
by itself, the stage of development in this case being measured as of 1928
and the growth over 1928—1955. A growth pattern of this sort is to be
expected of any country undergoing rapid industrialization, but in the
Soviet case the evidence suggests it has been accentuated by planned
design,an effortto "overcome and surpass the leading capitalist
economies."
Growth has varied widely not only among industries, but also over
different spans of time. The early years were marked by disorder, war,
and chaos, so that measurable industrial output dropped by 80 per
cent between 1913 and 1920. By 1927 or 1928, industrial output had
roughly recovered to its 1913 level in quantitative terms, though a general
deterioration in the quality of industrial goods over this period meant that
the recovery was less complete.Moreover, it was uneven even if no
allowance is made for deterioration in quality: the 1913 level of output was
not achieved in the case of consumer goods, while it was somewhat
exceeded in the case of all other products.
With the institution of the First Five Year Plan at the end of 1928,
growth accelerated rapidly and generally except in consumer goods.
The acceleration continued through the Second Five Year Plan and
extended into consumer goods. Against a background of political purges
and partial wartime mobilization, the pace of industrial growth slackened
in the succeeding three years of the short-lived Third Five Year Plan,
and such growth astook place may be attributedtoterritorial
expansion.
World War II brought with it a sharp decline in output—offset in
large part by Lend-Lease shipments—and heavy losses in manpower and
capital. Recovery was swift in the Fourth Five Year Plan, being aided
by collection of reparations and other economic policies in Eastern
Europe, so that the prewar level of industrial output was apparently
regained by 1948 or 1949. Rapid growth was maintained through the
Fifth Five Year Plan, where our study largely ends. Industrial output about
doubled between 1940 and 1955. The annual growth rate has declined
somewhat since 1955 to a level slightly above the average for 1928—
1955.
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Over the Plan period (1928—1955) the average annual rate of growth
was 6.9 per cent for all industry (6.5 per cent if territorial gains are
excluded), 8.4 per cent for intermediate industrial products, 14.7 per cent
for machinery and equipment, and 4.2 per cent for consumer goods. The
growth rate has tended to slow down or retard: for all industry, it was
9.9 per cent a year over 1928—1940 (8.9 per cent if territorial gains are
excluded) and 4.6 per cent over 1940—1955;or, if the war years are
removed from consideration, it was 12.1 per cent a year for 1928—1937,
9.6 per cent for 1950—1955, and 7.1 per cent for 1955—1958. There is a
similar retardation in growth for each of the categories of intermediate
industrial products, machinery, and consumer goods.
As in other countries, retardation in growth has been general for
individual industries, narrowly defined. The available evidence indicates
that most industries experienced a slower growth over the Soviet period
than over the late Tsarist period, and over the later Soviet years than
over the earlier ones. Moreover, most of the industries with retardation
in growth from the Tsarist to the Soviet period also had retardation
within the latter.
GROWTH IN OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT
The growth in industrial output has been accompanied by a rapid
expansion of the industrial labor force. The number of persons engaged in
Soviet industry, expressed in full-time equivalents, multiplied 3.3 times
between 1913 and 1955; the number of man-hours, 2.8 times. Thus 46
to 54 per cent of the growth in output may be attributed to expanded
employment and the remaining fraction to increased labor productivity.
Put another way, man-hours (or persons engaged) increased at an average
annual rate of 2.5 (or 2.9) per cent, while labor productivity increased at
an average annual rate of only 1.9 (or 1.5) per cent. The growth in out-
put per person engaged ranged from 0.7 per cent a year for wood
Construction materials to 4.3 per cent a year for electricity.
Growth in labor productivity, as we have measured it, has fluctuated
from period to period, and it is not clear whether there has been any
trend toward either retardation or acceleration. Employment in man-
hours apparently grew slower than output between 1913 and 1928, 1928
and 1937, and 1950 and 1955;it apparently grew faster between 1937
and 1950, a period of radical structural change in industry.Persons
engaged also outpaced output over 1928—1933, another period of radical
change, but otherwise grew slower than output. While the growth rate
in output per man-hour shows some decline between 1913—1928 and
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1928—1955 and between 1928—1940 and 1940—1955, it shows a sharp
increase between 1928—1937 and 1950—1955.
GROWTH IN OUTPUT AND POPULATION
While industrial employment was multiplying 3.3 times between 1913
and 1955, population multiplied only 1.4 times.Expansion of the
industrial labor force was achieved, particularly in the earlier phase of
industrialization, by drawing upon a large supply of underutilized labor,
attached primarily to agriculture.It follows that growth in industrial
output has been more rapid per head of population than per worker:
3.5 per Cent a year compared with 1.5 per cent.
Soviet demographic statistics are sketchy and subject to many doubts,
so that it is particularly difficult to say anything with confidence about
fluctuations in per capita output. According to Soviet data as modified
and interpreted by Western scholars, population within Soviet boundaries
grew at an average annual rate of 0.6 per cent over 19 13—1928, 1.0 per
cent over 1928—1937, 6.4 per cent over 1937—1940 (because of territorial
expansion), —0.9 per cent over 1940—1950 (because of war and its
aftermath), and 1.7 per cent over 1950—1955. Despite a rather erratic
relationship between growth in population and industrial output over
different spans of years, growth rates have tended to move in the same
direction for both total and per capita output. Thus the average annual
growth in per capita output rose from —0.5 per cent over 1913—1928 to
5.8 per cent over 1928—1955; within the Plan periods, it fell from 7.4
per cent over 1928—1940 to 4.6 per cent over 1940—1955, or from 11.0 per
cent over 1928—1937 to 7.8 per cent over 1950—1955.
Industrial Growth Compared: Soviet Union and United States
CONTEMPORANEOUS GROWTH
Over concurrent periods, industrial output has typically grown faster
percentagewise in the Soviet Union than in the United States. This was
also true of Russian industry in the late Tsarist period: Russian growth
over 1870—19 13 was at the average annual rate of 5.3 per cent compared
with U.S. growth at 5.1 per cent. The differential was similar over
1913—1955, with growth at 4.1 per cent a year in the Soviet Union,
excluding territorial gains, and 3.8 per cent in the United States. At the
same time, the absolute growth in industrial production has been much
smaller in the Soviet Union than in the United States.Measured in
1954 dollars, the value added of industry rose by about $30 billion in the
Soviet Union over this period but by $115 to $120 billion in the United
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States.Percentagewise, however, Soviet growth including territorial
gains has exceeded U.S. growth in all major sections of industry except
for food and allied products. With territorial gains eliminated, Soviet
growth was probably also slower—or no faster——than U.S. growth in the
cases of chemicals and textiles and allied products.
Over 1913—1928, Soviet output grew at 0.1 per cent a year, with no
allowance for deterioration in quality, while U.S. output grew at 3.7 per
cent. The differential swung sharply in the other direction over 1928—
1955, when growth was at the rate of 6.5 per cent a year in the Soviet
Union and 3.8 per cent in the United States. Within the latter period
comparative performance showed the same kind of shift: over 1928—1940,
the Soviet growth rate was 8.9 per cent a year (territorial gains excluded)
compared with the U.S. growth rate pf 1.8 per cent; over 1940—1955, on
the other hand, the Soviet rate was 4.6 per cent compared with 5.4 per
cent.Over 1950—1955, however, the Soviet rate of 9.6 per cent sub-
stantially exceeded the U.S. rate of 5.3 per cent. In the few years since
1955, growth has continued to be much faster in the Soviet Union—7. I
per cent a year over 1955—1958—-than in the United States—2.2 per cent
a year over 1955—1959. It is doubtful, however, that either of these rates
has much long-term significance.
Measured percentage growth in output has retarded in both countries
between the two periods of forty-odd years before and after the second
decade of the twentieth century. Within the more recent long period,
measured growth apparently also retarded in the Soviet Union but not in
the United States.
Population has generally grown more slowly in Russia and the Soviet
Union than in the United States, so that comparative growth in per
capita output favors the Soviet Union (or Russia) more than comparative
growth in total output. On the other hand, industrial employment has
grown more rapidly in the Soviet Union than in the United States: over
1913—1955, man-hours multiplied 2.8 as compared with 1.5 times; per-
Sons engaged, 3.3 as compared with 2.0 times. As a consequence, output
per unit of labor—and, on the basis of such evidence as is available,
output per unit of combined labor and capital—grew faster in the United
States than in the Soviet Union over all periods compared except 1 928—
1937 and 1950—1955. The respective growth rates over 1913—1955 were
2.8 and 1.9 per cent a year. The same generalization applies, at least on a
man-hour basis,toall major sectors of industry except metals and
machinery and allied products.In the United States, improvement in
output per man-hour accounted for 69 per cent of the multiplication in
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output over 1913—1955; in the Soviet Union, for 54 per cent. The evidence
on possible long-term drifts in the growth rate of labor productivity is
ambiguous in the case of both countries.
Compared with the United States, a larger fraction of Soviet industrial
employment—and, almost certainly, production—has been concentrated
in sectors of industry where labor productivity—and probably total
resource productivity—has been growing fasterthanthe average.
Consequently, measured growth in output is biased upward on this score
in the Soviet Union relative to the United States. Had the Soviet path
of expansion more nearly represented the U.S. path in this respect, the
Soviet production index would have shown a slower rise than it does.
Estimated in current dollars, the value added of Soviet industry rose
from about 14 per cent of the U.S. level in 1913 and 9 per cent in 1928 to
about 23 per cent in 1955; estimated in current rubles, from about 11 and
6 per cent to about 20 per cent. These estimates for 1955, even when allow-
ance is made for possible error (no less likely upward than downward), are
considerably lower than the conventional Western estimate of 33 per cent,
which has apparently been based on industry-by-industry comparisons of
physical output ratios. Such an estimate will almost certainly exaggerate
the comparative level of Soviet output since industry embraces a much
smaller range of products in the Soviet Union than in the United States.
While the relative gap in production has been narrowing between the
two countries, the absolute gap has been widening. Measured in 1954
dollars, the value added of industry was $25 to $30 billion larger in the
United States than in the Soviet Union in 1913, $50 to $55 billion larger
in 1928, and $115 billion larger in 1955.
The Soviet value of conventional military products amounted to more
than 70 per cent of the U.S. level in 1955 when estimated in current
dollars. The value of conventional military products accounted for more
than a quarter of the value added of industry in the Soviet Union and for
less than a tenth in the United States, all magnitudes again being expressed
in dollar terms. It goes without saying that these estimates for the Soviet
Union are subject to an even wider range of error than normally (probably
upward), since they have been made by roundabout procedures.
Soviet value added per head of population, evaluated in dollars, rose
from about 10 per cent of the U.S. level in 1913 and 7 per cent in 1928 to
about 18 per cent in 1955. On the other hand, value added per man-hour
employed fell from about 24 per cent in 1913 and 22 per cent in 1928
to about 20 per cent in 1955. In all cases the fractions based on evalua-
tions in rubles are smaller but move in the same directions.
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COMPARABLE GROWTH
While study of Soviet and U.S. growth over concurrent periods is of
interest in its own right and particularly in suggesting the course of events
in the immediate future,. it does not provide an adequate basis for apprais-
ing the growth-generating efficiency of the two economic systems. For
this purpose, an attempt must be made to analyze performance over
periods in which technological conditions and attained levels of production
relative to the resource potential are the same in the two countries.
Unfortunately, we cannot standardize both factors simultaneously in
historical study: to set the level of production equal—we take the resource
potentials as roughly equivalent in the two countries—is to project study
back into a period for the United States in which available technology
was substantially inferior to that of a "comparable" period for the Soviet
Union. Nevertheless, this is the best we can do, and at least we know that
the comparison favors the Soviet Union.
On the average and roughly speaking, the aggregate level of industrial
production was about the same in the United States of 1875 and the
Soviet Union of 1913 or 1928. In the United States, production grew at
an average rate of 5.1 per cent a year over 1875—19 17 and 5.5 per cent
over 1875—1902; in the Soviet Union, at 4.1 per cent over 19 13—1955 and
6.5 per cent over 1928—1955, territorial gains excluded. Hence, despite
the technological differential in favor of the Soviet Union, U.S. output
grew faster over the longer periods compared; on the other hand, it grew
slower over the shorter periods, though not perhaps beyond what would be
expected in view of the technological differential.Over even shorter
periods that leave out the worst years of Soviet performance, growth has
also been faster in the Soviet Union than over comparable U.S. periods.
For example, the average annual growth rate was 8.9 per cent in the
Soviet Union over 1928—1940, compared with 6.7 per cent in the United
States over 1875—1887.
In the case of growth in output per head of population, the differential
has been more favorable to the Soviet Union, so that Soviet growth
exceeds U.S. growth in all comparable periods studied.It is, however,
doubtful that this means much from the point of view of comparative
economic performance, since population growth has not conditioned—or
responded to—industrial growth to the same extent in the Soviet Union
as in the United States.
Comparisons of this sort cannot be made for growth in labor produc-
tivity, because sufficient data are not available for the earlier periods of
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U.S. history. On the basis of evidence for concurrent periods already
reviewed, it would seem unlikely that Soviet industry has outperformed
U.S. industry of the latter part of the nineteenth century in this respect.
Concluding Remarks
Soviet industrial growth has been impressive. In volume of output alone—
no account being taken of human and resource cost, product mix, or the
use made of products—Soviet percentage growth has exceeded U.S.
growth over contemporary periods, though not over comparable ones.
If the U.S. record of growth in industrial output has been impressive in
and of itself; without regard for the important consideration of how it has
been accomplished, then so has the Soviet record been, in the same
limited sense.
At the same time, the Soviet record is neither unprecedented nor
inexplicable. As noted, it has been at least matched in the United States
under more or less comparable basic conditioning factors, except the
economic system; it is being exceeded now by a number of countries in
the West, such as Japan, Taiwan, West Germany, and Greece, all of
which have experienced a more rapid rate of growth since 1950 than the
Soviet Union. Since 1953 it has been roughly matched by France and
Italy.
The explanation for the Soviet record lies in the unity of purpose and
practice on the part of the rulers—enhancement of state power—and in
their selective mobilization of resources—systematic favoring of industry
over other sectors and of investment over consumption, including leisure.
The cost has been heavy, in terms of resources expended as well as human
suffering. The amount of output generated per unit of labor is a fraction
of that characterizing industry in the United States, and it has become. a
progressively smaller fraction despite the fact that industrial capital has
apparently grown faster in the Soviet Union than in the United States.
This may all change in the future. We can expect a further gaining on
the United States in relative level of industrial output over the years
immediately in view, though this need not lead to a reducing of the absolute
gap or to an overtaking. There may well be gains in other respects as well.
In any case, we cannot know the future from the course of the past. The
most we can ask of history is some perspective, some background, against
which we can more meaningfully view the unfolding present and interpret
the receding past. It is this background that we have tried to sketch here,
in a book now at an end.
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